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Abstract 
This article ventures into the various interpretations given 
by the court for the execution of Section 153A of the 
Income Tax Act, 1961. It has forever been a conflict as to 
how the particular section has to be interpreted, in order 
to decide whether the items of regular assessment can be 
added back in the proceeding under section 153A, after 
the finalization of assessment. This article tries to decode 
the mixed opinions of the court with regard to whether it 
is the literal rule of interpretation or the rule of 
harmonious construction that would apply to interpret 
Section 153A. This issue has been dealt with by the 
authors by analysing the various tools of interpretation of 
statutes like Literal Rule of Interpretation, reading down 
of statute as a whole, Rule of Harmonious Construction of 
statute etc. and their application in various cases based on 
judicial dicta of the court of law. The authors, based on 
thorough analysis of Section 153A, based on the language 
of the provision and the interpretations attached to it by 
the  Judiciary,  have tried to resolve the conflict between 
the Literal rule of interpretation and harmonious 
construction.  
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I. Introduction 
This research paper mainly discusses the various interpretations 
given by the Courts with respect to Section 153A1 of the Income 
Tax Act,1961 (hereinafter referred to as Act) which mainly 
addresses the issue of items of regular assessments being added 
back in proceedings under Section 153A. Further, it talks about the 
importance of a notice being issued to the assessee when any 
further assessments are to be made, either with the purpose of 
adding items after finalizing the assessment or otherwise. This 
undertaking would discuss cases where in the Literal Rule of 
Interpretation is followed. When it comes to deciding this issue on 
the basis of the primary rule of interpretation, the intention has to 
                                                          
 
1 §153A, Income Tax Act, No. 43, Acts of Parliament, 1961 - “(1) 
Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 139, Section 147, Section 148, 
Section 149, Section 151 and Section 153, in the case of a person where a search 
is initiated under Section 132 or books of account, other documents or any 
assets are requisitioned under Section 132A after the 31st day of May, 2003, the 
Assessing Officer shall— 
(a) issue notice to such person requiring him to furnish within such period, as 
may be specified in the notice, the return of income in respect of each assessment 
year falling within six assessment years referred to in clause (b), in the 
prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner and setting forth such 
other particulars as may be prescribed and the provisions of this Act shall, so far 
as may be, apply accordingly as if such return were a return required to be 
furnished under section 139; 
(b) assess or reassess the total income of six assessment years immediately 
preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which such 
search is conducted or requisition is made : 
Provided that the Assessing Officer shall assess or reassess the total income in 
respect of each assessment year falling within such six assessment years: 
Provided further that assessment or reassessment, if any, relating to any 
assessment year falling within the period of six assessment years referred to in 
this sub-section pending on the date of initiation of the search under Section 
132 or making of requisition under Section 132A, as the case may be, shall 
abate.” 
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be found from the words used by legislature itself and that the 
Court should not supply casus omissus except in cases of clear 
necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the 
statute itself. The Court should not interpret the statute so as to 
create casus omissus when there is none. On the other hand, there 
are often arguments that the provisions of Section 153A should be 
construed harmoniously since literal construction leads to 
anomalous results. Assessment under Section 153A takes place in 
case of search proceedings and hence assessment can only be 
opened when search yields some incriminating materials while also 
giving the benefit of doubt, if any to the assessee.  
This article, through various cases and instances, makes an effort to 
unravel this issue, which has forever been disconcerting, when it 
comes to implementation of this area of law.   
II. Working of Section 153A 
The Assessing Officer is legally allowed to examine the earlier 
assessment, even if assessment has been conducted as per Section 
143 (3)2 of the Income Tax Act,1961. As a matter of rule and 
practice, search under Section 132 is always preceded by a proper 
satisfaction note, recording the facts and circumstances and making 
out of a prima facie case justifying the conduct of a search action. 
When it is so, non-recovery of incriminating material cannot make 
the satisfaction note non-existent. Even if incriminating material is 
not found, facts and circumstances narrated in the satisfaction note 
would still require examination and consideration later on in 
reference to various disclosures made by the assessee in the return 
of income. Clearly, assessment in Section 153A or in Section 153C, 
the requirement of incriminating material is nothing short of 
keeping oneself busy with the supposed intention. When the 
Section is not ambiguous, it cannot be assumed that Section 153A 
requires incriminating material to be present before an addition is 
made, as any attempt to assume so, will amount to reframing the 
legislation.3. In State of Kerala v. Mathai Verghese4 it has been 
                                                          
2? 
3Lairy Distributors Pvt. Ltd v. Dy. C.I.T., I.T.A. No. 6947/Del/2014. 
4 State of Kerala v. Mathai Verghese, (1986) 4 S.C.C. 746. 
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observed that the Courts cannot reframe the legislation for the very 
good reasons that it has no power to legislate.  
The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Nath Khanna v. 
CIT 5 has held that:  
“the first and foremost rule of construction is that the 
intention has to be found from the words used by the 
legislature itself. The Courts interpret the law and do not 
legislate the law. If a provision has been misused or is 
absurd, it is for the legislature to amend, modify, repeal, if 
deemed necessary.”  
Thus, the provisions should be read as a whole and as they exist, 
and there is no necessity of reading them down or providing casus 
omissus. Where the search is conducted, there is a mandate on the 
Assessing Officer (A.O) to issue notice calling for return of all six 
assessment years preceding the current assessment year. 
Thereafter, the first proviso casts a duty on him to assess or 
reassess the total income in respect of each assessment year. In this 
respect he has no choice but to make six assessments. In order to 
obviate a necessity of making two assessments in respect of the 
year for which proceedings are pending, the second proviso 
provides that pending assessments shall abate, which means that 
only one assessment under Section 153A shall be made in respect of 
assessments which have abated because of this provision. Both the 
first and second proviso direct the A.O to assess total income, 
which has to be computed in accordance with Section 5 of the Act 
which talks about scope of total income, therefore, in respect of all 
the assessments, the A.O has to make an assessment or 
reassessment of the total income and in doing so, there is no fetter 
on his powers i.e., the A.O is not restricted to the consideration of 
only incriminating materials or undisclosed valuables. The 
provisions of Chapter XIV B of the Act caused excessive litigation 
and therefore the scheme of search assessments has been modified. 
In the case of ShankerNarain Construction Co. &Ors. v. State of 
Karnataka & Anr6, the Hon‟ble Karnataka High Court held that: 
                                                          
5 Prakash Nath Khanna v. C.I.T., (2004) 266 I.T.R. 1. 
6 Shanker Narain Construction Co. &Ors. v. State of Karnataka &Anr, 
(2004) 276 I.T.R. 56.  
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“nothing is to be added and nothing is to be taken away from the 
statute unless there are adequate grounds for doing so.”  
The introduction of provisions of Section 153A was to avoid 
litigation, which proliferated on the issue of „undisclosed income‟.7 
The avowed purpose of bringing new provisions will be forfeited 
and the litigation will proliferate on the question as to what 
constitutes incriminating materials with respect to such 
assessments, if the same controversy is raised under the new 
provision as well, by arguing that no reassessment can be made in 
respect of completed assessment, as no incriminating material is 
found. The A.O can look into all matters that are necessary for him 
to compute the total income for all the six assessment years. 
Coming to the apprehension, one may assume that some additions 
which were made in the original assessment and deleted by the 
higher forum may be made in reassessment under Section 153A. 
However, it may be stated that such an apprehension is unfounded 
and the A.O under section 153A will have to follow the decision of 
the higher forum as a matter of judicial discipline. 
II. 1 Harmonious Construction of the taxing statute v. Literal 
Interpretation of Section 153A 
Often there are arguments stating that language is an imperfect 
instrument for the expression of human intention and therefore 
intention of legislature has to be relied upon.8 It is a settled rule that 
where the literal interpretation of a statutory provision leads to a 
manifestly unjust result contrary to intention of legislature, the 
Court might modify the language used by the legislature so as to 
achieve the intention of the legislature and produce a rational and 
congruent construction.9 The provisions of the statute have to be 
read harmoniously in case of obscurity, ambiguity or lack of 
harmony created by the language of a provision in the statute.10 An 
                                                          
7 All Cargo Global Logistics Ltd v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, 
(4212) I.T.A.T. Mumbai (1409). 
8 K.P. Varghese v. ITO, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1922. 
9 South India Steel Rolling Mills, Madras vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, 
Madras, (1997) 9 S.C.C. 728. 
10 Ashok Kumar Thakur v. UOI, (2008) 6 S.C.C. 1. 
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attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant 
provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute.11One 
provision should be construed with reference to the other provision 
to make the provision consistent with the object sought to be 
achieved.12 The words of Learned Hand J. as quoted by the 
Supreme Court in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama13, aptly 
describe the above propositions: 
"Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid, but with some 
imagination of the purposes which lie behind them." 
The first proviso to Section 153A reiterates the words of Section 
153A (1) (b) that the total income of previous six years needs to be 
assessed or reassessed immediately preceding from the assessment 
year relevant to previous year in which search is conducted or 
requisition is made. On a literal interpretation of the given 
provisions, it may be concluded that the provision demands 
assessment or reassessment for all the six years and hence additions 
may be made even in cases of completed assessments as per the 
first proviso. However, applying the doctrine of Harmonious 
Construction, the first proviso should be read in harmony with the 
second proviso under Section 153A. The second proviso expressly 
states that only the proceedings pending at the time of search or 
seizure would abate, which led to the conclusion that completed 
assessments do not abate and hence stand as it is. A harmonious 
construction of the entire provision would lead to the conclusion 
that the word 'assess' has been used in the context of abated 
proceedings and reassess has been used for completed assessment 
proceedings. This would not abate as they are not pending on the 
date of initiation of the search, or making of requisition. This  
would also necessarily support the interpretation that for the 
completed assessments, the same can be tinkered, only based on 
the incriminating material found during the course of search or 
requisition of documents.14 
                                                          
11 SirajulHaq Khan v. Sunni Central Board of Waqf, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 198. 
12 Anwar Hasan Khan v. Mohd. Shafi and Ors. (2001) 8 S.C.C. 540. 
13 Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama, (1990) 1 S.C.C. 277. 
14 Jai Steel (India) v. Asst. Commissioner of Income, [2013] 219 Taxman 
223 (Raj). 
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 Sections 153A, 153B, 153C and 153D were introduced later by the 
legislature, to specifically address the issue of assessment, in cases 
of search and seizure after 31st March 2003.15 Therefore, Section 
153A is intricately linked with Section 132 and 132A of the Act.16 
The logical corollary which follows is that, though assessment has 
to be made of total income in the period of six years preceding the 
previous year, but any additions or changes in completed 
assessments could only be made on finding of any material during 
the search. Therefore, the assessee respectfully submits that 
according to the dominant object doctrine17, the provision of 
Section 153A, 153B, 153C and 153D were framed to effect 
assessment in case of search or seizure. In such case, if additions are 
made without any undisclosed or escaped income being found, 
then it will only amount to change of opinion of the A.O. which 
will not be in congruity with the intention of the Legislature. 
However, all these arguments and interpretations of the written 
law disregard the primary rule of interpretation which is that the 
intention has to be found from the words used by legislature 
itself.18 The rules of interpretation other than the literal rule would 
come into play only if there is any doubt with regard to the express 
language used or if the plain meaning would lead to an 
absurdity.19The statutory language is clear and in its literal 
interpretation, it does not give any absurd and anomalous results. 
The Court should not supply Casus Omissus except in cases of clear 
necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the 
statute itself.20 The court should not so interpret the statute as to 
create Casus Omissus when there is really none.21 
                                                          
15 C.I.T. v.M/s. PurtiSakharKarkhana Mahal, (2013) 153 T.T.J. (Nag) 12. 
16 Jai Steel, supra note 8. 
17 C.I.T. v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association, [1980] 121 
I.T.R. 1 (S.C.). 
18 PrakashNathKhanna v. C.I.T., (2004) 266 I.T.R. 1 (S.C.). 
19 Pandian Chemicals Ltd. v. C.I.T., (2003) 5 S.C.C. 590. 
20PadmaSundaraRao (Deceased) v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2002) 255 I.T.R. 
147 (S.C.). 
21Shankaranarayana Construction Co. and Ors.v. State of Karnataka and 
Anr. (2004) 276 I.T.R. 56 (Kar.). 
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 In Section 153A of the Act, the first proviso clearly states that the 
Assessing Officer shall assess or reassess the “total income” in 
respect of each assessment year, falling within such six assessment 
years. This total income has to be computed as per Section 522 of the 
Act. Assessing authority can take note of the income disclosed in 
the earlier return, any undisclosed income found during search or 
and also any other income which is not disclosed in the earlier 
return or which is not unearthed during the search, in order to find 
out what is the total income.23 There can be only one assessment 
order in respect of each of the six assessment years, in which both 
the disclosed and the undisclosed income would be brought to 
tax.24 Therefore, it is clear that even if an assessment order is passed 
under Section 143(1) or 143(3) of the Act, the Assessing Officer is 
empowered to reopen those proceedings and reassess the total 
income taking note of the undisclosed income, if any, unearthed 
during the search.25 The purpose of second proviso is to prevent 
multiplicity of proceedings and to ensure that there are no two 
conflicting authorities on the same point.26 There is no 
disconnecting between the first and second proviso. The words 
assess and reassess used in the provision signify two things. The 
word assessment is used in context of proceedings, which shall 
abate because of second proviso, and reassessment has been used 
in context of the completed assessment proceedings, which would 
not abate as they are not pending on the date of initiation of the 
search or making of requisition27.  
II.2 Reading down of the provision found Ultra-Vires 
No additions can be made in cases of completed and finalized 
assessments. This is because an assessment once made is final and 
it is not open to the department to go on making fresh computation 
                                                          
22§5, Income Tax Act, No. 43, Acts of Parliament, 1961. 
23Canara Housing Development Company v. D.C.I.T., MANU/ 
KA/3491/2014. 
24C.I.T. v. Anil Kumar Bhatia, (2012) 211 Taxman 453 (Delhi). 
25supra note 23. 
26Memorandum Explaining Finance Act, 2003, available at 
http://www.indiabudget.nic.in/ub2003- 04/mem/mem1.pdf. 
27supra note12. 
Jha and Zaveri                     Working of Section 153A of the Income Tax Act 
53 
 
orders to the end of the time.28 The same limitations can be read 
into provisions of Section 153A and it may be concluded that 
finality of concluded assessments cannot be disturbed.29 The same 
has been reiterated by various tribunals.30 Section 153A envisages 
assessment of total income and not only that of undisclosed 
income.31 It was further made clear by the Allahabad High Court 
that only the pending assessments and not the completed 
assessments, abate on initiation of proceedings under Section 
153A.32 Therefore, assessment as envisaged by the second proviso 
would be held in cases of abated proceedings while reassessment 
can only be done in cases of completed assessments where 
incriminating material is found. 33 Thus finding of incriminating 
material is a prerequisite to tinker with the finalized or completed 
assessments.34. In the case of CIT v. Lancy Constructions35, the High 
Court of Karnataka held that “assessment cannot be reopened on 
the basis of a search where no incriminating evidence is found and 
merely on the basis of further investigation of books of accounts as 
that would amount to the Revenue getting a second opportunity 
which is not permissible in law.”  
Under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act 1961, on satisfaction of 
certain conditions, the Assessing Officer is under the obligation to 
issue the notice to the person requiring him to furnish the return of 
income of six years immediately preceding the year of search, 
where a search or requisition is initiated after 31.05.2003.  
The word used here is "shall" and thus the Assessing Officer is 
under a complete obligation to assess or reassess the real income of 
those six years on the basic of the material found in search. In the 
case of All Cargo Global Logistics Ltd & Others v. Deputy Commissioner 
                                                          
28 I.T.O. v. Habibullah (S.K), [1962] 44 I.T.R. 809 (S.C.). 
29 C.I.T. v. Continental Warehousing Corporation (NhavaSheva) Ltd., 
[2015] 374 I.T.R. 645 (Bom). 
30 A.C.I.T. v. Mrs. Uttara S. Shorewala, [2011] 48 S.O.T. 6 (Mum). 
31 C.I.T. v. Anil Kumar Bhatia, [2013] 352 I.T.R. 493(Delhi). 
32 C.I.T. v. Shaila Aggarwal, [2012] 346 I.T.R. 130 (All). 
33 All Cargo Global Logistics Ltd. v. D.C.I.T., [2012] 181 I.T.R. 106 (Mum). 
34 C.I.T. v. Kabul Chawla, [2015] 61 taxmann.com 412 (Delhi).  
35 C.I.T. v. Lancy Constructions, I.T.A. 528/2014. 
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of Income Tax, Mumbai36 it was held that in other cases, in addition 
to the income that has already been assessed, the assessment under 
Section 153A will be made on the basis of incriminating material, 
which in the context of relevant provisions means- 
(i) books of account, other documents, found in the course of 
search but not produced in the course of original 
assessment, and  
(ii) undisclosed income or property discovered in the course of 
search.  
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Bench in the case of 
Sanjay Aggarwal v. DCIT37, after reiterating the decision of Hon‟ble 
Delhi High Court in the case of Anil Kumar Bhatia38,  and ITAT 
Special Bench in case of All Cargo (supra), has held: “We, therefore, 
hold in principle that no addition can be made for any assessment 
year u/s. 153A, the assessment for which is not pending on the 
date of search, unless any incriminating material is found in the 
course of search.” 
The Kolkata Bench of ITAT in LMJ International v. Dy. CIT,39 while 
discussing the nature of additions held that, where nothing 
incriminating is found in the course of the search relating to any 
assessment years, the assessments for such years cannot be 
disturbed. The Ahmedabad Bench of the ITAT in the case of 
Meghmani Organics Ltd v. Dy CIT40, has observed that:  
“The power under Section 153A of the Act should, 
therefore, be with reference to assessment or reassessment 
of pending assessment or qua the materials found during 
the search. Since admittedly nothing was found during 
the search to suggest that any income has escaped 
assessment, the AO does not have any jurisdiction for 
framing assessment under Section 153A of the Act.” 
                                                          
36All Cargo Global Logistics Ltd & Others v. Deputy Commissioner of 
Income Tax,Mumbai, 147 T.T.J. 513. 
37Sanjay Aggarwal v. D.C.I.T., I.T.A. No.3184/Del/2013. 
38Anil Kumar Bhatia, 352 I.T.R. 493 (Del). 
39LMJ International v. Dy. C.I.T., (2008) 119 T.T.J. (Kol.) 214. 
40 Meghmani Organics Ltd v. Dy. C.I.T.(2010) 129 T.T.J. (Ahd.) 255. 
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In CIT v. Kabul Chawla41, it was held that where on the date the 
search assessment stands completed and there is no incriminating 
material, no additions can be made on income already assessed. In 
Guruprerna Enterprises v. Asst. CIT42, it was held that under Section 
153A, the issues decided in the assessment cannot be reconsidered 
and re-adjudicated, unless there is some fresh material found 
during the course of the search in relation to such points. 
Also in the case of Gurinder Singh Bawa v. Dy CIT43, it was held that 
where search under Section 153A is being carried out by the 
Assessing Officer and wherein all the assessments pertaining to six 
years immediately preceding to the assessment years were 
complete, the Assessing Officer cannot make an addition in those 
completed assessments, unless there is any incriminating material 
recovered during the search. 
On the other hand the principle of reading down should be used 
only in cases where plain and literal meaning of the provision 
confers arbitrary, uncanalised or unbridled power. In other words, 
the question of reading down comes in, if it is found that the 
provisions are ultra-vires.44Section 153A was held to be intra-vires 
in Saraya Industries Ltd. v. Union of India45due to the fact that notice 
is required to be issued which clearly postulates that the principles 
of natural justice are incorporated in the provision. In the case of 
Union of Indian and Another v. DeokiNandan Aggarwal it was held by 
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court that: 
“There is nothing in the language of the provisions, which 
would indicate that the assessment is restricted to 
incriminating material or the basis of the assessment 
would be, that which is discovered during the search. 
When the legislature has provided unfettered power to the 
Assessing Officer then the court cannot impose fetters. 
                                                          
41 CIT v. Kabul Chawla, I.T.A. No. 707/2014/ Delhi H.C. 
42 Guruprerna Enterprises v. Asst. C.I.T., (2014) 38 D.T.R. 225. 
43 Gurinder Singh Bawa v. Dy. C.I.T., (2013) 149 I.T.R. 29. 
44 Electronics Corporation of India and Others. v. Secretary Appellant 
Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, (1999) 4 S.C.C. 
258; K.G. Ashok & Others v. Kerala Public Service Commission & 
Others, (2001) 5 S.C.C. 419. 
45Saraya Industries Ltd v. Union of India, (2008) 216 C.T.R. Del 257. 
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The court cannot add the words to a statute or read what 
is not expressly provided.”46 
The wisdom of the legislature should be respected and it could not 
be presumed that it passed an invalid legislation. In many cases, 
the various courts have interpreted Section 153A with fetters and 
with qualifications. This is wholly unnecessary and against the 
power of the courts such as in Saf Yeast Co. Pvt. Ltd, Mumbai v. 
Department Of Income Tax47, where it was held that the Assessing 
Officer under Section 153A has been entrusted with the duty of 
bringing to tax the total income of an assessee whose case is 
covered by Section 153A, by even making reassessments without 
any fetters, if need be.  In case where there are two interpretations 
possible, the one validating the statute should be adopted. For this 
purpose, the court may have to give restrictive or expansive 
meaning keeping in view the nature of legislation.48 
Provisions in Sections 153A-153C were introduced in place of the 
provisions contained in Chapter XIV B. The earlier provisions led 
to parallel proceedings, being regular assessment proceedings and 
computation of undisclosed income49. This resulted in excessive 
litigation and thus the scheme was modified. Therefore, in the new 
provisions, Assessing Officer is given the power to assess the total 
income, intention being to avoid proceedings which proliferated on 
the issue of “undisclosed income”. The memorandum explaining 
the Finance Act does not use the word “undisclosed” anywhere 
while explaining the new provisions of Section 153A to 153C. If the 
same controversy is raised under the new provision, by arguing 
that no reassessment can be made with respect to complete 
assessment, where no incriminating material is found, the avowed 
purpose of bringing new provisions will be forfeited and the 
litigation will proliferate on the question as to  what constitutes 
incriminating material with respect to  such assessments.  
                                                          
46 Union of Indian and Another v. DeokiNandanAggarwal, 1992 Supp. (1) 
S.C.C. 323. 
47Saf Yeast Co. Pvt. Ltd, Mumbai v. Department of Income Tax, I.T.A. No. 
5182/Mum/2007. 
48Calcutta Gujrati Education Society v. Calcutta Municipal Corporation 
and Others, (2003) 10 S.C.C. 533. 
49supra note48. 
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So it would be safe to say that even if the legislation produces some 
unjust results, it is for the legislature to amend. Court interprets 
and does not legislate. If provision has been misused or is absurd, it 
is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed 
necessary. Legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial 
interpretative process.50 Computing re-assessment for all six years 
even if no incriminating material is found in course of search for 
some years does not amount to harassment etc. and even if it does 
so, the same has to be ignored in view of clear statutory provision.51 
II.3 The statute must be read as a whole 
Every clause of a Section should be construed with reference to the 
context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put 
on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the 
whole statue.52 Section 153A should be read in context of other 
Sections such as Section 132, 143, 147, 148 etc. 
Section 153A should be read with Section 132. It is to be noticed 
that the prerequisite for invoking assessment under Section 153A is 
search under Section 132. Once the Section is triggered, it is 
mandatory for the Assessing Officer to issue notices calling upon 
the assessee to file returns for the six assessment years prior to the 
year in which the search took place.53 When the assessee will file 
return for six years, no fetter can be imposed on assessing officer 
while conducting assessment. The search under Section 132 is 
based on “reasons to believe” and is open to challenge under Article 
226. In C. Ramaiah Reddy v. Assistant Commissioner of Income54, it was 
categorically held that what could be the subject-matter of a Writ 
Petition under Article 226 cannot be the subject-matter of a 
statutory appeal under the Act. Further, they have said that the 
right of appeal is a right, which has to be conferred by a specific 
provision under the statute, when a statute does not provide for an 
                                                          
50 supra note40. 
51 All Cargo Global Logistics Ltd. v. D.C.I.T., (2012) 137 I.T.D. 287 (Mum). 
52 supra note42. 
53supra note2. 
54 C. Ramaiah Reddy v. Assistant Commissioner of Income, 
(2011)244C.T.R.(Kar)126. 
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appeal against the action under Section 132(1). The assessee not 
only has the right of appeal but an appeal filed against the 
assessment order he cannot challenge the validity of a search. 
Section 132 is the prerequisite for Section 153A but to restrict the 
scope of the additions under Section 153A because of language of 
Section 132 will give a very narrow interpretation to Section 153A.  
If the interpretation as per the doctrine of  harmonious construction 
is accepted, it will mean that during pendency of assessment 
proceedings under Section153A, separate proceedings under 
Section 14855 may be initiated for making assessment of escaped 
income, discovered otherwise, than during the  course of search. It 
is an established proposition that once proceedings are pending 
under Section 153A,  no parallel proceedings under Section 143(3) 
or Section 147 or Section 148 would lie. The second proviso was 
included specially to avoid multiplicity of proceedings56. There is 
no such proviso in Section 158B and thus separate assessment or 
reassessment proceedings are permitted under normal provision of 
the Act. 
It is a settled principle of law that when reopening a case under 
Section 148, any income that has escaped assessment and which 
comes to the notice of the A.O. in the course of the reassessment 
proceedings can be assessed. This income is exclusive of the income 
that has escaped assessment for which the case has been reopened 
under Section 148. Limiting the scope of proceedings under Section 
153A would imply putting the searched person at premium in 
comparison to the normal situation. This occurs as there is no 
apparent mechanism by which such escaped income (which was 
not discovered during the course of search but came to notice either 
in post search investigation or during investigation carried out in 
the assessment proceeding or any other source), can be assessed. 
Perusal of Section 153A will show that it starts with a non obstante 
clause. This clause removes fetters imposed upon the Assessing 
Officer to assume jurisdiction to reopen the assessment under 
Section 147 and Section148. The time-limit within which notice 
under Section 148 can be issue, as provided in Section 149 has also 
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been made inapplicable by the non obstante clause.57 The 
requirement under Section 151 and time limit prescribed under 
Section 153, have also been done away with, in cases covered under 
Section 153A. With all fetters having been pulled out, the Assessing 
Officer under Section 153A has been entrusted with the duty of 
bringing to tax, the total income of an assessee whose case is 
covered by Section 153A, by making reassessments without any 
fetters, if need be. 
The ITAT has held that completed assessments will abate even if no 
incriminating material is found in course of search.58 Therefore it 
would be incorrect to hold that the items of regular assessments 
cannot be added back in proceedings under Section 153A and in 
concluded assessments under Section 143(3) or where no notice 
under Section 143(2) has been issued to initiate the proceeding 
under Section 143(3). But when the assessment has attained finality 
due to passage of time, it cannot be disturbed in a proceeding 
under Section 153A. 
III. Conclusion 
 The authors conclude that under Section 153A, additions can only 
be made in cases of completed and finalized assessment when 
some incriminating material is found. Based on the rule of Literal 
Interpretation of the Statute and reading down the statute as a 
whole, it is clear that the main objective of the Legislature behind 
Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is to entrust the Assessing 
Officer with the duty of bringing to tax the total income of an 
assessee, whose case is covered under Section 153A. This is 
achieved by making reassessments without any fetters and thereby 
also includes the reassessment of the completed assessments even if 
no incriminating material has been found during the course of 
search or requisition of documents. Further, limiting the scope of 
proceedings under Section 153A would imply putting the searched 
person at premium, in comparison to the normal situation, as there 
                                                          
57supra note45. 
58RajatTradecom India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. C.I.T, 120 I.T.D. 48 (Indore), 
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is no mechanism by which such escaped income can be assessed. 
Thus, going by the intent of the legislature the authors are of the 
view that Section 153A of the Act includes within its scope the 
reassessment of even the completed assessments, even if no 
incriminating material has been found during the course of search. 
 
